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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERLIN JACKSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LOTHAIRE R. RICH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12602 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
Statement of Kind of Case 
This is an action by plaintiff on an express contract 
to recover for work and materials furnished on defend-
ant's rental unit in a building owned by defendant in 
Fillmore, Utah, which the plaintiff occupied as a 
tenant, and a counterclaim by the defendant for unpaid 
rent and damage to the premises. 
Disposition in Lower Court 
The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict against 
the defendant on plaintiff's complaint in the sum of 
1 
$1,229.00 was rendered, which was offset by the sum 
of $490.00 in unpaid rent, with the net sum of $739.00 
from which verdict the defendant appeals. ' 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Reversal of the judgment against the defendant 
in toto and the awarding of a judgment against the 
plaintiff in the sum of $490.00 for unpaid rent, to be 
offset by the sum of $179.18 for work done by the plain-
tilff, on other premi.ses, at defendant's request. 
Statement of Facts 
This concerns a rental contract between plaintiff 
and defendant for the north half of a store at about 
20 South Main Street in Fillmore, Utah. The plaintiff 
approached the defendant about the middle or latter 
part of October in 1968 ( T 173-29) and asked if the 
store was for rent. The defendant told plaintiff that 
the north half was for rent at $140.00 per month (T 
173-9) Plaintiff stated that he was going to start a home 
improvement business, and that he was well-qualified in 
all phases of the building line ( T 173-20 & 21), that he in· 
tended to put in electrical and plumbing appliances and 
install them, and was financially able to ruri such a place 
of business, and had already purchased supplies and 
paid cash for them ( T 173-18 to 28) 
2 
Subsequently it was agreed that the plaintiff would 
rent the premises for the sum of $140.00 per month. 
Since the premises were in need of repair and the plain-
tiff had represented himself to be well qualified to do 
any and all repairs required, it was agreed that the 
plaintiff would repair the building, and that defendant 
would allow the plaintiff one half of the monthly rental, 
or $70.00 per month, as credit for the work done on 
the premises, said work done to be credited at the rate 
of $3.50 per hour (Ex. P-1). The other half of the 
rent, or $70.00 per month, was to be paid to the defend-
ant in cash monthly by the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff was to have completed the repairs to 
the building by December 1, 1968, during which time 
plaintiff could occupy the premises without payment 
of rent. Plaintiff subsequently was injured, so def end-
ant extended the time for completion of the work until 
January 1, 1969. Because of the injury of the plaintiff, 
defendant authorized plaintiff's brother, William, to 
also work on the premises and have this work credited 
toward payment of the one half of the rent at the same 
rate of $3.50 per hour, but no one else was ever author-
ized to work on the premises. It was also agreed that 
defendant would allow the sum of wholesale cost plus 
10 per cent for materials furnished. (Ex. P-1) The 
time for completion of the work was again extended 
to February 1, 1969. (See letter of Jan. 30, 1969, Ex. 
P-2 and P-3) and plaintiff agreed to start paying the 
monthly rental on February 1, 1969. (See plaintiff's 
Answer to Counterclaim, para. 2, R 10) . 
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Defendant authorized plaintiff to finish some work 
on ~th.er p~emises (See letter of Jan. 7th, Ex. P-2). 
Pla.mtiff did this work, and claimed $179.18 (Com-
plamt, para. 6, R-2) , which defendant stipulated as 
credit to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff actually had possession of the premises 
from November 1, 1968, to l\Iay 16, 1969 (Ex. P-6) 
(See defendant's Notice to Quit and Vacate served May 
19, 1969. Ex. P-5) 
Plaintiff never did pay the $70.00 cash per month 
as was agreed, even though defendant made a demand 
for the same in a letter of April 17, 1969. (Ex. P-4). 
Plaintiff never offered to pay rent at any time (T 181-
3 and T 7 4 9 to 20) , either before or after notice to 
vacate or pay rent (Ex. P-5). The defendant went to 
Fillmore for the first time since January, 1969, about 
J nne 5, 1969, and saw the condition of the building. 
Defendant's letter of September 2, 1969, authorized 
plaintiff to move all of the equipment out of the building 
except the back partition, the sheet rock on the middle 
partition, and the two sheets of plywood in the window. 
Plaintiff moved out of the premises the 4th or 5th of 
September, 1969 (T 184-22), and removed everything 
from the premises, including the rugs in the windows, 
except those items above mentioned. 
The plaintiff sued to recowr for all of the work he 
claims was done on the premises by himself and others, 
plus the materials, at retail less 10% instead of whole· 
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sale plus 10%, without any credit for the items which 
were removed from the premises, even though, by plain-
tiff's own admission, there was never any agreement for 
defendant to pay him cash for the work. ( T 94-20 to 
24) Jury awarded the verdict to the plaintiff, from which 
the defendant appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO TRIAL ON THE 
GROUND THAT THERE WAS NO JUSTICI-
ABLE CONTROVERSY. 
The plaintiff in the complaint alleged an express 
contract for the defendant to pay plaintiff $3.50 per 
hour for services rendered. 
In answer to Question No. 3 of defendant's In-
terrogatories, asking "Is it not also true that defendant 
never agreed to pay you any money for work done on 
the portion you were to occupy?" plaintiff answered: 
"Defendant (obviously an error- should be plaintiff) 
agreed to pay $140.00 a month with one half of the 
rental costs to be credited upon the improvements made 
by the plaintiff on the building he was renting." (Also 
see R 22-25 to 27) 
Thereby plaintiff admitted he was to take out the 
cost of improvements by credit at $70.00 per month. 
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The defendant made a motion to dismiss the pla'. t~ff's complaint on the grounds that there was no jus~­
c1able controversy, as the pleadings and facts show the 
payment for work done on the rental unit was to be paid 
by credit on the rent, which effectively refutes the 
plaintiff's ~pecific allegation for payment (T 4-18 to 
T 5-15) 
At the time this motion was made there was nothing 
in the record to indicate that the plaintiff was relying 
on quantwn meruit as it hadn't been pleaded, and it was 
agreed that plaintiff had not paid the rent, and the de· 
fendant argued that a person in default had no standing 
before the court, and at this point there was no contro· 
versy. Also ( T 5-20-22) he who seeks equity must do 
equity. 
The plaintiff's attorney in his argument brought 
forth the theory of quantum meruit, but admitted he 
hadn't pleaded it. ( T 6-5 to 12) He never asked to 
amend his complaint to include an alternative remedy 
at that time, and stated that he could show damages on 
specific agreement. (T 5-29, 30 and T 6-29 to T 7-9) 
There was no pre-trial order in the file, although 
the minutes (R-27) show that the order should have 
been filed, and plaintiff's attorney had been ordered to 
prepare it ( T 7-27 to T 8-u) It should also be pointed 
out that there was no order in the file setting aside the 
default of the plaintiff. (Pre-trial Order signed June 
29, 1971, and Order setting aside default signed July 
1, 1971 (R-29 and R-30.) Defendant submits that he 
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was entitled to a dismissal based on the file and all the 
facts, and it was error to proceed further. The motion 
was taken under advisement, but never ruled on. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN SUB-
MITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE 
EXPRESS CONTRACT, AS PLAINTIFF HAD 
BREACHED THE CONTRACT AND HAD NO 
RIGHT TO RECOVER UNDER THE LAW. 
On the contract proven as pleaded, the plaintiff 
was given three months to prepare the premises, then 
to start paying the rent, $70.00 by credit on work done 
at $3.50 per hour and materials furnished at wholesale 
cost plus 10%, and $70.00 cash, commencing on Febru-
ary 1, 1969. The plaintiff breached the contract by 
failure to complete the work agreed upon, even though 
given three months free occupacy in which to complete 
it. In addition to the work that was done, plaintiff was 
supposed to have put in a restroom (T 47-14, 20), which 
he never did. Plaintiff also breached the contract as he 
never paid rent as agreed or even tendered or offered to 
pay ( T 7 4-9 through 20) . 
17 Am. J ur. 2d on Contracts, Sec. 355, page 791, 
states: 
An obligation to perform arises upon the making 
of a binding contract, notwithstanding it is not ~o 
be performed until a future date, and the !ule ~s 
that for a party to rec~)Ver he must ~s~abhsh his 
own performance, or his off ~r a~d ability to per-
form, or a valid excuse for his failure to perform. 
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Cit.ed under the footnote, Nees v. Weaver, 222 
Wis. 492, 107 A.L.R. 1405. 
Performance in the true spirit and meaning of the 
agreement is expected in the law. Also cited: Miller 
v. Young, 1970 Okla. 503, 172 P.2d 994. 
Performance by the obligee or excuse therefore is 
essential to the right to recover upon the contract having 
dependent covenants. Cites Western U. Tel. Co. v. 
Yopst, 118 Ind. 248, 20 N.E. 222. 
A failure on the part of one party to a contract to 
comply with its terms destroys his right to enforce it 
against the other or to derive any statutory rights there· 
from. ' Sec. 358 of the same volume at 797 on necessity 
of off er of performance: 
The general rule is that where performance of an 
agreement is to be concurrent on both sides, 
neither can recover without showing performance 
or an offer or tender of performance on his part. 
and cites a number of cases in the footnote. 
Sec. 365, page 807 of the same volume states: 
As a rule a first party guilty olf a substanti~l ~r 
material breach of contract cannot complam 1f 
the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He 
can neither insist on performance by the other 
party nor maintain an action against the other 
party for subsequent failure to perform. 
In Vol. 17A C.J.S., Contracts, Sec. 566: 
Performance or Breach. A party seeking to en· 
force performance of a contract or to recover for 
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the breach thereof where the contract contains 
mutual covenants must not only allege but prove 
that he has performed his own part. ... Other-
wise he must allege and prove legal excuse for his 
non-performance .... In an action to recover for 
a breach of contract plaintiff must allege and 
prove his willingness to perform. 
The footnote cites Roseleaf Corp. v. Radis, 264 
P.2d 964. 
Applying the above principles to the instant case, 
the plaintiff never alleged that he had performed and 
never proved it. He never alleged he paid or offered to 
pay the rent, and he admitted that he never completed 
the work to be done on the contract, and never offered 
any excuse for failure to complete the work. He never 
expressed a willingness to perform, and never offered 
to complete the work or pay the rent and continue in 
the premises. In fact, under the express contract proven 
by him and all the law, he had never done anything 
by which the law could let equity apply, in the form of 
quantum meruit or other remedy, and allow him a re-
covery. The instant case clearly shows that the plaintiff 
expected to get his payment for work done from the 
$70.00 per month credit. (See plaintiff's Answer to In-
terrogatories R 22-19 to 24, also T 94-20 to 24 and 
T 69-3 through 12). Any recovery would have to be in 
direct conflict with the terms of the express contract. 
POINT III. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT 
HAVE ADEQUATE TIME TO MEET THE 
ISSUE OF QUANTUM MERUIT. 
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The quantum meruit issue was discussed at pre. 
trial, but the pretrial order was not signed by the Judge 
until June 29, after the trial was started on the 28th, and 
was not received by the defendant until 2 :45 p.m. on 
Wednesday, June 30, after the selection of the jury 
and the day before the trial was to proceed at 9 :00 a.m. 
in Fillmore. The quantum meruit was discussed on June 
28 prior to selection of the jury ( T 6-6 through 15) but 
no attempt was made to amend the pleadings at any time 
to include quantum meruit itself or as an alternative 
remedy to the express contract. 
As is well known, the parties have a right to meet 
the issues, and in this instance, at the pre-trial, it was 
ordered by the Judge that a pre-trial order be prepared 
if the case wasn't settled by the 20th of May, and that 
thereafter the case would be set for trial. However, 
the case was set for trial on June 29, without a pre· 
trial order having been submitted by plaintiff, giving 
the defendant no opportunity to meet the issues. 
Am. J ur. Vol. 41 on Pleading, Sec. 383, states 
among other things: 
There can be no recovery upon a cause of action 
however meritorious it may be or how satisf ac· 
torily proved that is substance variant from that 
which is made by the plaintiff unless an amend· 
ment be made to conform the pleading to the 
proof of the new cause of action. 
The Utah court has held that it is necessary to properly 
apprise the defendant of the quantum meruit claim. See 
Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 264 P.2d 279, 1 Utah 2d 
175. 10 
Action w~s ?rought to recover money allegedly 
owed plamtiff by defendant for services per-
formed by plaintiff as a manager for defendant. 
The Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, Joseph E. Nelson, J., entered judgment 
for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Co~t h:ld. ~hat it was error to charge de-
fendant with habihty under quantum meruit an 
issue which defendant was never called o~ to 
meet. 
There was no attempt in the instant case to amend 
or conform the pleadings to the proof. 
The submission to the jury was error on the above 
ground. 
POINT IV. THE SUBMISSION OF THE 
CASE TO THE JURY ON A QUANTUM MER-
UIT BASIS WAS ERRONEOUS AS IT WAS 
NEVER PLEADED BY PLAINTIFF. 
The theory of quantum meruit was never pleaded 
by the plaintiff ( T 6-5 to 13) and no amendment was 
ever offered to conform the pleadings to the record 
(see whole record.) 
Numerous courts hold that where there has been 
an express contract alleged, there can be no recovery 
on a quantum meruit. In the instant case the plaintiff 
alleges an express contract, stating it is both verbal 
and in writing ( T 6-28 to 30) and all the evidence 
(Ex. P-1 through P-6) clearly indicates such to be 
the case. The evidence clearly establishes an agreement 
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by the plaintiff to rent the premises for $140.00 per 
month, and other terms as previously set forth. This is 
clearly an express contract and was argued by plain-
tiff's counsel to be such. 
In support of the theory that there can be no re-
covery on quantum meruit where an express contract 
is pleaded, we quote from Vol. 17A C.J.S., Contracts, 
Sec. 569, page 1095: 
a. Allegation of Express, and Proof of Implied, 
Contract. Generally, a plaintiff cannot, in an ac-
tion brought on an express or special contract, 
recover, or introduce evidence, on an implied con-
tract or quantum meruit, unless, under some au-
thorities, he amends his pleadings or fails to estab-
lish the express or special contract. 
At page 1096 it states: 
In an action brought on an express or special con-
tract plaintiff cannot recover on proof of an im-
plied contract or on quantum meruit. 
This has a footnote with numerous cases cited from 
the U. S. Court and twenty-four state courts, from 
Arizona to Wisconsin. 
In the same volume at 1099 it states: 
Contract breached by plaintiff. In the absence of 
an alternative plea on quantum meruit plaintiff 
who declares on contract which is shown to have 
been breached by him may not recover on quan· 
tum meruit. 
In Vol. 35A of Words and Phrases, page 413, it 
sets forth, citing Wade v. Nelson, 95 S.W. 956, citing 
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Hutson v. Tyler, 36 S.W. 654, McDonnell v. Steven-
son, 77 S.W. 760: 
In an action on an express contract alleged to 
have been performed by the plaintiff there can 
be no recovery on quantum meruit. 
Also in Vol. 8, Pacific Digest 2d, Sec. 346 at page 
660 on Declaring on an express contract and recovering 
on quantum meruit, it cites a number of cases, some of 
which are: 
Arizona, Brown v. Beck, 202 P.2d 528, 68 Ariz. 
139. 
Where plaintiff testified that there was a written 
contract on subject of his employment by de-
fendant, but terms of contract were not estab-
lished, plaintiff should not have been permitted 
to recover value of services rendered by him to 
defendant on quantum meruit theory. 
Montana, Puetz v. Carlson, 364 P.2d 742, quot-
ing 17 C.J.S. Contracts Sec. 569. 
Express contract must be proven as alleged and 
failure to do so is not merely variance but failure 
of proof, and recovery may not be had on proof 
of implied contract. 
Montana, Arrow Agency v. Anderson, 355 P.2d 
929. 
As a general rule, recovery cannot be had on 
quantum meruit under complaint alleging express 
contract. 
New Mexico, Cavez v. Potter, 274 P.2d 308, 58 
N.M. 662. 
One cannot sue on express contract and recover 
on quantum meruit. "There complaint was for 
13 
J:>reach of express contract, alternative praver for 
JUdgmen~ in quantum mer1;1it could not authorize 
recovery rn quantum mermt. 
Oklahoma, Oklahoma Natural G(UI Co. v. Her. 
ren, 195 P.2d 278, 200 Oki. 480. 
Where petition declares alone on express con. 
tract to complete full performance thereof, no 
recovery can be had on quantum meruit. 
Oregon, Flaherty v. Bookhultz, 297 P.2d 856 
207 Or. 462. ' 
One cannot sue upon an express contract and re· 
cover upon a quantum meruit, and to recover 
upon a quantum meruit, it must be pleaded and 
proved. 
Utah, Morris v. Russell, 236 P.2d 451, 120 Utah 
545. 
Where both parties to an action to recover for 
services rendered alleged same express contract, 
it is improper to submit the case to jury on quan· 
tum meruit. 
Please note the above case is cited in 26 A.L.R. 
2nd 947. 
There are some courts that do allow recovery in 
certain instances, but they are distinguishable from the 
present case. 
So it must be concluded that where a specific con· 
tract is pleaded and proven, as in the instant case, the 
plaintiff cannot recover on quantum meruit, and it was 
error to submit it to the jury. 
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POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN SUB-
MITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY ON 
QUANTUM MERUIT AS THE EVIDENCE 
·w AS NOT PREPONDERANT AS TO REA-
SONABLE VALUE OF THE SERVICES. 
Quantum meruit, which was introduced without 
pleadings or amendments offered, we find being defined 
in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. page 1408, as: 
"As much as he deserved." The common count in 
an action of assumption for work and labor found-
ed on an implied assumption or promise on the 
part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff as much 
as he reasonably deserved to have for his labor. 
This is supported and is replete with citations from 
Vol. 35A of Words and Phra.ses, Quantum Meruit, 
page 413, from which we cite Adams v. Smith, 307 
S.W.2d 525, 527: 
"Quantum meruit" means "as much as he has de-
served"; and in action on quantum meruit burden 
is on claimant to plead, prove and have jury in-
structed that his charges are fair and reasonable. 
There was no showing in the present case that the 
charges were fair and reasonable, but were based on 
the specific contract. That the correct measure is the 
benefit conferred on the defendant is shown in the same 
volume and page, Bouterie v. Carre, La. App., 6 So.2d 
218: 
The amount recoverable on a "quantum meruit" 
depends upon the extent of the benefit conf err.ed 
having reference to the contract for the entire 
15 
work, and this is usually the contract price /esi 
the damages caused by not complying with the 
exact terms of the contract. (Emphasis added) 
Nearly all cases cite reasonable value as the amount 
of recovery, but it must be the reasonable value to the 
recipient, as in the case also cited on page 416 of 35A 
Words and Phrases. It cites the above case further: 
Where a party derives any benefit from services 
rendered by another, the law reasonably implies 
a promise to pay on the part of the one who has 
received such benefit, such amount as it is rea-
sonably worth, on the theory of "quantum mer· 
uit." (Emphasis added) 
Quantum meruit is based on the theory of unjust 
enrichment, which Black's Law Dictionary, page 1705, 
states under this: 
Doctrine that a person shall not be allowed to 
profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's 
expense. American University v. Forbes, 88 N.H 
17, 183 Atl. 860. 
This is also shown in Vol. 35A of Words and Phra.ses, 
page 417, under unjust enrichment, in Ylijarvi v. 
Brockphaler, 7 N.W.2d 314, 319, 213 Minn. 385: 
The basis of a recovery on a "quantum meruit" ~ 
that the defendant has received a benefit from the 
plaintiff which it is unjust for defendant to re· 
tain without paying for. 
The test is how much the defendant has been enrichea 
or benefited, and the mere doing of work for another 
does not justify recovery, as is clearly shown on page 
16 
417 of 35A Words and Phrases in Ylijarvi v. Brock-
phaler, supra: 
~here a cont~act for the drilling of a well pro-
vided for a 4-mch casing and was not thereafter 
modified, and c~n~ractor, after partial drilling of 
~he well as specif i~d, substituted a 21/2-inch cas-
mg and after. drillmg to a further depth, but be-
fore completmg the well ceased work and re-
moved the 21/2-inch casing and the contractor's 
equipment from the owner's premises and it was 
not shown that the part performance was of any 
benefit to the owner, it was not unjust for owner 
to retain the work performed and materials fur-
nished without paying for them, and contractor 
could .not recover on a "quantum meruit" for con-
tractor's part performance. 
Applying this result to the present case, the defendant 
should be able to take back the building without paying 
plaintiff anything as there was no showing of the bene-
fit to the defendant, but there was actual showing of 
damage to defendaant instead of benefit. 
On this point the Utah court in Y owng et ux. v. 
Hansen et ux., 117 Utah 591, 218 P.2d 666, allowed a 
plaintiff who had breached the contract to recover for 
the amount they contributed to the defendants over and 
above the amount of harm they caused the defendants 
by their breach. However, in Young v. Hansen, supra, 
the court left guidelines when it can be applied, among 
other things, if the breach was not deliberate. Here the 
breach was deliberate, as shown (T 309-4 to 15) when 
plaintiff said he deliberately did not put in the restroom 
or finish the back part. 
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So, if we assume for the sake of argument that 
this is a case for quantum meruit and apply the rule 
of Young v. H amen to the instant case, by using the 
testimony of the plaintiff's own expert witnesses, when 
considered against the testimony as to damage cost 
which were unref uted, we would find: 
Plaintiff's witness-Vernon Peterson, expert (T. 114 to T. 1221 
Original Estimate in First 
Class Condition (T. 119-13 to 19) $1,495.0ij 
Minus half of sheetrock estimate 
as he computed twice as much as 
actually was done -$518.40 -Vz 
(T. 117-20 to T. 118-16) 
Minus $108.00 on floor as he 
figured 2000 feet at 15c per foot, 
and Jackson claimed only 60x20 
feet, $288.00 total estimate 
(T 118-18 to 29) 
Total with Deductions off 
Jackson claimed two coats of paint, 
475 yards at 75c per _yd. (T. 119-1 
to 11) For extra coat (T. 119-1 
to 11) 
Total with two coats of paint 
Add credit for work done on other 
premises 
Total credits 
Minus the amount for work which 
had to be redone. Jackson said he 
left holes in north wall (T 102-4 to 12) 
and sheet rock had to be 
sanded off on all seams, on all 
walls and ceiling scraped 
(T. 294-27 to T. 295-2)._So. 
all the work done on pamtmg was 
of no benefit to defendant and 
couldn't be charged 
2 coats @ $374.55 each 
Minus time spent in repairi~g work 
done by Jackson so premises. 
could be used damage deduct.ible 
as can only recover for benefit 
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-$259.20 
- 108.00 
-$759.10 
367.2ij 
$1,127.80 
374.5! 
$1,502.35 
179.li -$1,681.53 
over and above harm done (T. 
291 to T. 295) 
Keith Cole, 17 hrs. @ $3.50 
Sterling Rich, 6 hrs. @ $4.50 
Lothaire R. Rich, 171/z hrs. 
@ $3.50 
Minus rent @ $140.00 per mo. from 
Nov. 1, 1968 to May 16, 1969, 61/z 
mos. time shown in pleadings and 
testimony-only recover on 
amount above harm 
Total to be Deducted 
Net owing defendant by plaintiff 
after deduction for harm done 
and items where defendant 
received no benefit by this 
witness 
$59.50 
27.00 
61.25 
- 147.75 
910.00 
$1,816.85 
$ 135.32 
Please note there was no breakdown shown from this witness 
except as brought out on cross-examination. 
Vernon Peterson testimony as applied to the particular situation 
under the law, as set forth in Point V. 
Plaintiff's witness-- Brooks Anderson, expert taken from testi-
mony (T. 133 to T. 152) and breakdown as submitted by him on 
Exhibit D-7. 
Plus credit for work on other premises 
Total Credit 
Deduction for cost of painting which 
had to be redone, so was of no benefit 
as estimate on Ex. D-7 
(See Peterson sheet for full 
explanation) 
Less cost of repairing work done by 
Jackson so could be used, see 
breakdown on Peterson explanation 
Less value of rent not received @ 
$140.00 per mo. from Nov. 1, 1968 
to May 16, 1969-admitted by plaintiff 
and shown in pleadings, 61h mos. 
Total to be Deducted 
Net owing defendant by plaintiff after 
deducting for harm done and items 
on which he received no benefit 
$210.00 
147.75 
910.00 
$ 684.20 
179.18 
$ 863.38 
-$1,267.75 
$ 404.37 
Brooks Anderson testimony as applied to the particular situation 
under the law in Point V. 
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Note that neither testified that the work was well done 
a.n~ tha.t there was no testimony by any of the plain. 
tiffs witnesses who testified that the work was done 
well, and that even the plaintiff himself admitted that 
it was good enough for him, but wouldn't be gooa 
enough for Mr. Warner's store. 
Mr. Brooks Anderson had a complete breakdown 
on the costs and figures for doing the whole job as tola 
to him by Mr. Jackson, (T 136-6 to 14, T 138-18 to 
21), but even though he had called Brooks Anderson 
as a witness, the plaintiff refused to use the figures and 
breakdown which Anderson had prepared, and it was 
necessary for the defendant to introduce the estimate 
as Exhibit D-7 (T 145-14 to 27). The total on this 
was shown in the above figures as computed by the 
adding machine tape, which tape is attached to the 
exhibit but was not a part of the exhibit at the time, 
as Mr. Anderson stated that he didn't add it as he 
thought it could be added. 
It should also be noted that Exhibit P-6 show1 
three women and several men were used, none of which 
were shown to have any experience or ability along this 
line, and even the plaintiff himself admits that he was 
not experienced at putting on sheetrock and perfatape. 
The only direct evidence showing who could be used 
to work on the premises showed only that plaintiff's 
brother William could be used. Plaintiff testified that 
he was authorized to use anyone when he was in de· 
fendant's office in February (by defendant, and Jan. 
20 
or :Feb. by plaintiff). Both were long after the con-
tract was made and work had been started. All of th;;; 
people used were paid the $3.50 per hour which de-
fendant agreed to pay only Jackson or his brother 
' regardless of ability. 
From the above it can be seen that there was no 
benefit accrued to the defendant, as shown by the testi-
monies. Mr. Peterson never noticed the condition of the 
premises after the work done by Mr. Jackson, to testify 
whether it was a good or bad job, and Mr. Brooks 
Anderson did note the condition of the premises, even 
though tliere was a store in it and it had been repainted, 
and he testified: 
But I don't think he done the best job in the 
world, and I told him that. (Referring to Mr. 
Jackson.) (T. 142-6 to 8) 
Mr. Frampton, the other expert witness called by 
plaintiff, even though he testified he was asked to figure 
the cost of doing the work in the unit by Mr. Jackson, 
according to Mr. Jackson's own instructions, testified 
that he didn't figure it or check it as to the quality, and 
he didn't testify as to the quality of the workmanship. 
The testimonies of Keith Cole and Sterling Rich both 
show that the work was poorly done, and had to be 
redone. This was testified to by the defendant also, 
and Mr. Warner testified that the building was in poor 
condition, and Mr. Jackson himself testified that he 
left holes in the wall that had to be spackled, and of 
course spackling would require another paint job. 
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After all of the testimony by most of the witnesse~ 
saying that the work was poorly done, the plaintiff and 
his counsel changed tactics and began contending that 
while the work would not stand critical inspection for 
other people, and maybe not for a furniture store, put 
in by Mr. Warner, it was good enough for l\fr. Jackson. 
(T 308-17 to 24 and T 314-7 to 15) 
Plaintiff argued that he was building for himself 
and not for someone else. This was a store, and to be 
of benefit to defendant, it should have been built so 
that others could occupy it when l\fr. Jackson left it, 
as was necessary here. The jurors, who were all friends 
or acquaintances of plaintiff's counsel, were obviously 
convinced that it was not necessary to build it for use 
by others. 
This clearly indicates thinking diametrically op· 
posed to the law, which requires defendant to pay for 
only the benefit received by him, so if it isn't fixed good 
enough so that it will benefit defendant in his rentals 
when the building is left vacant, then obviously de· 
fondant should not be required to pay anything. To do 
otherwise would not be equitable. 
All of the plaintiff's evidence was for the purpose 
of showing the time and materials he had put in, not 
at any time showing what it would be worth to the 
defendant. The plaintiff testified as to the total cost 
he was billing, but he at no time testified as to the worth 
of the items that were taken out, such as the partition 
across the middle, plus a counter across the middle, also 
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the long counter on the north side, and the stand for 
the wash basins. These are shown in defendant's exhibits 
D-2 and D-5. 
In fact, when questioned on cross-examination, Mr. 
Jackson specifically stated that he did not keep track 
of the amount of time or materials he had put in on any 
of the particular items, and he would have no way of 
knowing what they would be worth. 
Further, the defendant pointed out that the total 
hours claimed by plaintiff for Ex. P-6 totaled 3121/2 
hours, and did not check with the actual figures as 
. checked, but no attempt was made to correct the same. 
The only situation where the price of the item taken out 
was known was where Jackson admittedly took out the 
carpeting, which cost $47.00 by his testimony, but in 
presenting this to the jury, there was no deduction made 
from the total billing. 
Except for a charge from the invoices of $58.00 
which should have been $.58, there was no attempt in 
the discrepancies to make any allowance for the mis-
takes made on the figures (T 241-27 to T 242-4 and 
T 244-9 to 13) or for the property taken out of the 
premises, as shown in the invoices and the testimony. 
So it would be impossible from the evidence pre-
sented to arrive at the net benefit to the defendant, and 
to submit this to the jury was error. 
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POINT VI. THAT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI. 
DENCE. 
There was not evidence in any manner preponderant 
which would support the verdict on a quantum meruit 
basis. In addition to the matters set forth in Point V 
I 
and which is all incorporated herein as a part of Point 
VI as if fully set forth herein, we point out that plain. 
tiff's testimony was contradictory, ambiguous, evasive, 
and deliberately misleading. 
Plaintiff testified that he was doing work for other 
people at this time (T 237-21 to 26 and T 236-12 to 
15) and that he paid sales tax for materials which he 
was going to use in the defendant's building, but for 
other people he charged the sales tax when he sold it. 
Among those invoices charged to defendant there were 
two classse of bills, namely one with sales tax and one 
without, which were marked for resale. In his general 
testimony he stated that he wasn't charged sales tax 
on those items which were for resale, but when they 
were to be used by himself there was a tax charged. If 
all of the materials invoiced and charged to the defendant 
were in fact used in defendant's premises, there would 
have been no need to differentiate in the billing. 
Plaintiff testified that part of the materials were 
used on other premises besides the rental unit ( T 238· 
15 to 19, T 238-25 and 26, T 239-14 to 16, T 246-19 
to 23, and T 247-21 and 22) . However, in his final 
testimony he stated that all of the materials on the 
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invoices listed and charged to defendant were put into 
the rental unit, regardless of whether or not they were 
marked for resale ( T 272-17 to T 273-3, and T 308-11 
to 16), which is clearly contradictory. 
POINT VII. THAT THE COURT ERRED 
IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY, AS 
SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING IN-
STANCES. 
A. On, Instruction No. 15, the court erred in para-
graph 2 of the instruction, in that the court instructed: 
If you should further find that plaintiff provided 
labor and materials in remodeling and renovating 
defendant's business in an amount equal to or in 
excess of the rent required, then you may find 
that the plaintiff was not in default and would be 
entitled to require the performance of the def end-
ant under the terms of the agreement. 
This leaves a direct inference that no matter what the 
plaintiff had done, he would be entitled to recover the 
amount of work and labor performed which was in 
excess of the $70.00 cash due for rent, due on the first 
of February, and that he would not be in default. 
Actually, even if this were true, under the law as ap-
plied in quantum meruit, the court should have pointed 
out that he had occupied the premises from Nov. 1, 
1968 and so would have had to show that there had , 
been work done in excess of the value of three months' 
rent, or $420.00, plus the $70.00, for a total of $490.00 
as the total harm done to the defendant from his occu-
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pancy. In truth and in fact, plaintiff's time Exhibit 
P-6 shows that up to February I, 1969, there were onlr 
IOI hours put in, or $353.00, and plaintiff's Exhibit 
P-7 for materials does not show any dates on the charges, 
and therefore, under any theory, plaintiff would have 
to be in def a ult, contrary to the instruction. 
This is in direct conflict with the express agreement 
pleaded and proven by plaintiff. 
Under this in.struction, it would have allowed the 
plaintiff to stay in the premises without paying any 
cash on the rent, until all that he claimed was used up 
in rent, and he could then move out and the defendant 
landlord would get nothing for the time it was occupied. 
This also does not take into consideration the fact 
of the plaintiff's breach of contract, and duty to perform 
before he can demand payment for any of the work 
done, or to give a reasonable excuse or be willing to 
complete performance. Instead, by his own admission, 
he deliberately did not complete the contract (T 309·4 
to 15) 
If the law as instructed in this paragraph were 
followed, then landlords would in effect have to guar· 
antee the success of any tenant in business who had made 
any improvements, whether made with or without an 
agreement, as every improvement made would entitle 
the tenant to an off set regardless of whether or not he 
paid rent. This was error. 
B. Instruction No. 16 states that the plaintiff 
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should be awarded such damage as will fairly and ade-
quately compensate the plaintiff for money and dam-
ages sustained as a result of labor and materials fur-
nished. This instruction is in error and contrary to law, 
as the test is not whether or not it will fairly and ade-
quately compensate the plaintiff when he is relying 
on the application of quantum meruit, as was allowed 
here, but the true test is the reasonable value to the 
defendant for the work performed and materials fur-
nished, over and above the harm or damage done to the 
defendant. This is clearly set forth in Point No. V, and 
it is supported and set out in Young v. Hansen, supra. 
Here it was held that plaintiffs could recover a judg-
ment for the amount they contributed to the defendants 
over and above the amount of harm done defendants 
by their breach. The case previously cited in Point V, 
Ylijarvi v. Brockphaler, supra, also emphasises this fact. 
In the instant case, there was no showing as to the 
benefit over and above the amount of harm, and in truth 
and in fact the only proof was as to the actual amounts 
claimed for work and materials, and not the reasonable 
worth or benefit over and above the amount of damage. 
On quantum meruit, there should have been an 
allowance for all the rental time that the plaintiff occu-
pied or had his equipment and inventory in the premises, 
namely from November 1, 1968, to September 2, 1969, 
at $140.00 per month, as an offset, as this would be the 
amount of rent .due for the time the plaintiff occupied 
or held up the use of the premises. Inasmuch as the 
27 
plaintiff had only pleaded express contract, the defend. 
ant's pleadings only set out the actual amount of the 
rent from when it was agreed that it would start, but 
based on the detriment as quoted in Young v. Hansen, 
previously cited, to the defendant, any recovery for the 
plaintiff would have to be over and above that amount. 
This also does not take into consideration the damage 
done and time spent in fixing the building, which was 
shown as $147.75 plus the cost of the painting, $210.00. 
This is shown to be the law under Point No. V, and the 
amounts shown on the information as set forth for 
Brooks Anderson and Vernon Peterson, plaintiff's ex-
pert witnesses. 
C. In regard to Instruction No. 17, this was in error 
for the same reasons as set forth regarding Instruction 
No. 16, as the $490.00 claimed for unpaid rent was the 
express contract agreed price, but was not based on the 
quantum meruit as allowed in this particular suit. When 1 
quantum meruit applies, defendant is entitled to set off 
all of the damages against any claim of the plaintiff, 
as shown in Point No. V. To give this instruction was 
error. 
D. Ref erring to Instruction No. 20, this instruction 
was erroneous in that the instruction combined the ex· 
press and implied agreement together, while, if the 
implied agreement had been left out, and the plaintiff 
had relied on the express contract, he would have been 
entitled to recover the agreed price if he hadn't defaulted 
(as he did default he could not recover), under the law 
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for the value of the work done over and above the detri-
ment suffered by the defendant. See the previous points 
covering this same postulate. 
E. The court erred with respect to Instruction No. 
22, as the second paragraph in the instruction is com-
pletely contrary to law and negates the first paragraph, 
which first paragraph was based on the express contract. 
If express contract was found, the first paragraph 
would cover it without the second paragraph. How-
ever, the second paragraph states that if improvements 
were placed in the building, that plaintiff is entitled 
to reimbursement, which is not in fact at all true, as 
he' must show performance of his contract, reasonable 
excuse for failure to perform, or willingness to perform, 
and/ or a tender of performance, before there can be 
recovery by the plaintiff. This is clearly set forth in the 
argument in Point No. II. 
~'. The court erred in failing to give defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 2. Title 78, Chapter 36, Sec. 
3 of the 1953 Utah Code Annotated, as amended, gives 
a landlord the legal right to dispossess the tenant on 
a three-day notice to vacate or pay the rent when the 
tenant has defaulted in the payment of rent. The plain-
tiff assumed this risk when he went into the premises 
and didn't request a lease or any special provision for 
recovery for work if bis tenancy was terminated. This 
was in spite of the fact that defendant offered to give 
plaintiff a lease (Ex. P-3) . 
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G. The court erred in failing to gh·e defendant'; 
requested Instruction X o. 6. This instruction was baste 
on the premise that a defaulting party cannot recore 
where he has made no tender of performance, and t 
amply set forth under the citations under Point IJ 
and is complete and proper in all respects, and shoulc 
ha n been gi•en. 
H. In failing to gi'e defendant's requested Instrut· 
tion X o. 12, the court erred. This should ha'e beet 
gi>en as there was endence clearly showing that thi 
work was poorly done, and had to be modified or redont 
because of the ,,·orkmanship, and this could be useil 
as an offset to reduce the benefit to the defendant, ani 
all of the cases and authorities cited under Point Y su~ 
port the fact that the defendant can otfset any and ali 
damages or detriments which he incurs against an; 
claim which is made under quantum meruit, to makt' 
the amount of reconry by the plaintiff, if any, reason·1 
able. 
POIXT YIII. TH_.\T THE COl__LlT ERRED 
IX F~.\.ILIXG TO AD)IIT DEFEXD_-L.,T'S Of., 
FER OF EXHIBITS. 
That during the course of the trial, plaintiff's at· 
torney repeatedly referred to exhibits and letters written 
bv the defendant cross examined defendant on them. 
a~d quoted from. them, attempting to show bad faiili 
on the part of the defendant for failing to object to 
the condition of the premises. eYen though defendant 
testified that he hadn't seen the pn-iperty from Janua0· 
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until June of 1969, by taking excerpts out of context 
to try and impeach the defendant's testimony, where 
the whole letter as written would have explained the 
whole situation. But the defendant was not permitted 
to introduce the exhibits as offered, although plaintiff 
identified them and could have testified as to any mis-
statement he thought they contained. 
This was particularly true with the letter as to the 
time of objection to the work done, and would have 
shown that the defendant had not inspected the prem-
ises and couldn't have objected prior to the time he did 
object. The letter regarding the permission to remove 
the materials from the premises, which was quoted from 
by the plaintiff, would have explained the general situ-
ation, but defendant was not allowed to introduce them. 
The exhibits not admitted were designated D-12, D-13, 
D-14, D-15, and D-16 (T 270-30 to T 271-1 to 5). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The defendant concludes that each and every point 
as set forth herein is sufficient in and of itself to set 
aside the verdict as rendered. The record and transcript 
reveal that the trial was in error from commencement 
to conclusion in numerous respects. 
The plaintiff has invoked quantum meruit, or "as 
much as he deserves." Let us see what he deserves. 
He entered into an express rental contract, which 
he never honored by payment of any money. 
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He agreed to repair and improve the premises 
which he partially carried out, the balance of which b; 
deliberately ref used to complete. 
The work he did was poorly done and to a large 
measure had to be redone. 
He had possession of the premises from November 
1, 1968, to May 16, 1969, without an offer to pay, or 
any excuse for his refusal, without alleging that he had 
performed or had been prevented from performing, or 
without being willing to perform. 
He received from the work he had performed the 
movable improvements without crediting the defendant 
for anything which he had received. 
So the question is what he deserves. The answer 
must clearly be that he deserves to have his verdict set 
aside and be required to pay the defendant the $490.00 
rent due on the express contract less the $179.18 for 
work on other premises which plaintiff performed, as 
the defendant counterclaimed on the express contract 
and could not recover as defendant deserves on quan· 
tum meruit, and in addition to pay all costs of this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOTHAIRE R. RICH 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
2815 East 3365 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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